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Abstract 
This paper studies effects of education policy on early fertility. We study a major edu-
cational reform in Sweden in which vocational tracks in upper secondary school were 
prolonged from two to three years and the curricula were made more academic. Our 
identification strategy takes advantage of cross-regional and cross-time variation in the 
implementation of a pilot scheme preceding the reform in which several municipalities 
evaluated the new policy. The empirical analysis draws on rich population micro data. 
We find that women who enrolled in the new program were significantly less likely to 
give birth early in life and that this effect is driven by women with higher opportunity 
costs of child rearing. There is however no statistically significant effect on men’s ferti-
lity decisions. Our results suggest that the social benefits of changes in education policy 
may extend beyond those usually claimed.   
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1 Introduction   
It is well known that women who give birth in their teens experience substantially 
worse long-run social and economic outcomes.
1  This is also true for their children. 
Given these facts it is hardly surprising that a strong policy debate has emerged in many 
countries over which policies are most successful in combating high teenage birth rates. 
The efficiency of various types of family planning policies has been documented in pre-
vious studies (e.g. Kearney and Levine 2009; Grönqvist 2009). It has also been pro-
posed that fertility decisions are heavily influenced by education policy. This idea fol-
lows directly from the many descriptive studies which show that highly educated 
women tend to postpone childbearing for a considerable period of time (e.g. Maynard 
1996). There are also strong theoretical arguments for why education policy could lead 
to delayed childbearing. First, educational investments are likely to alter an individual’s 
cost/benefit calculation regarding sexual activity and contraception; for instance, by 
providing formal knowledge or by strengthening the proficiency to process and value 
information (Michael 1973). Higher education also increases expected future human 
capital, which could influence fertility decisions through higher opportunity cost of 
child rearing (cf. Becker 1991). Moreover, being enrolled in education may mechani-
cally prevent individuals from having children since it restricts the time available for 
taking care of them.  
Regardless of the underlying mechanisms, the question of whether education policy 
can be used as a tool to prevent teenage childbearing obviously hinges on whether or 
not education is causally linked to fertility. An individual’s choice of schooling is not 
random and it is easy to imagine factors that may give rise to a spurious relationship. 
For instance, individuals with high career aspirations or more patience may be more 
likely to enroll in higher education and at the same time more inclined to postpone 
childbearing.   
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of education policy on early fertility. 
We study a major educational reform in Sweden occurring in the beginning of the 1990s 
                                                 
1 Although the evidence is not undisputed it is supported by several compelling studies e.g. Ashcraft and 
Lang (2007); Geronimus and Korenman (1992); Hotz, Mullins and Sanders (1997); Klepinger, Lundberg 
and Plotnick (1999); Kearney and Levine (2007). Holmlund (2005) provides the most convincing evi-
dence for Sweden by exploiting variation in the timing of childbearing across pairs of sisters.   4  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
in which vocational tracks in upper secondary school were prolonged from two to three 
years and the academic content of the curricula was increased substantially. The 
changes made students graduating from vocational tracks eligible to apply to university. 
Hall (2012) finds that this reform led to increased educational attainment among voca-
tional students. Our identification strategy takes advantage of cross-regional and cross-
time variation in the implementation of a pilot scheme preceding the reform in which 
several municipalities evaluated the new policy. This institutional feature creates a 
source of plausibly exogenous variation in access to the new tracks.  
Our empirical analysis draws on data from administrative registers covering the uni-
verse of the Swedish working-age population observed annually from 1985 through 
2007. The dataset includes a large set of standard individual characteristics (age, marital 
status, income, place of residence etc.) as well as detailed information of each indi-
vidual’s entire educational history, ranging from compulsory school through university. 
It also contains a link between children and their biological parents. 
As already mentioned, several studies have documented a strong negative association 
between acquired levels of schooling and early fertility (e.g. Maynard 1996). Only a 
couple of papers have however studied shifts in education policies that are likely to be 
unrelated to other determinants of fertility. McCrary and Royer (2011) examine US 
school entry policies but find no significant effect of maternal education on early child-
bearing. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) investigate the consequences of changes 
in compulsory schooling laws in the US and in Norway. Their results show that women 
who obtained more education as a consequence of the law changes had fewer teenage 
births.
2  
Our work makes several novel contributions to the literature. The main innovation is 
that we consider the effect of education policy along a different margin of the educa-
tional distribution: the upper secondary level. Little is known about the returns to edu-
cation along this margin. Recent research however indicates that the financial return to 
education is particular high for this level of education (Aakvik, Salvanes and Vaage 
2010). There is also evidence that the non-monetary return to education is higher further 
                                                 
2 Instead of early fertility Currie and Moretti (2003) study the effect of education on total fertility in the 
US and find that exogenous increases in education indeed lower fertility. It is possible that this effect is 
driven by postponed childbearing.   
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up in the educational distribution. The results in Lochner and Moretti (2004) indicate 
that the effect of schooling on incarceration is more strongly negative at the upper 
secondary level. These findings suggest that the response in fertility to changes in edu-
cation policy could actually be stronger once we move beyond the compulsory level.  
Another major contribution of our paper is that it is the first to consider both 
women’s and men’s fertility decisions in a developed country.
3  This is especially 
important considering that women by tradition exercise greater control over fertility 
(e.g. by regulating the use of contraceptives or deciding on whether or not to abort an 
unwanted pregnancy) and that education policy therefore may have less capacity to 
influence men. Understanding whether the potential social benefits of changes in 
education policy are confined only to women is of course key knowledge when trying to 
assess the cost-effectiveness of different educational reforms.  
Last, since we have access to measures of individual ability (proxied by compulsory 
school GPA) and parental socioeconomic background we are able to investigate 
possible differential effects of the policy with respect to the opportunity costs of child 
rearing. Although economic theory clearly suggests that individuals facing distinct 
opportunity costs make different fertility decisions, data limitations has prevented pre-
vious studies to examine such heterogeneous responses.   
In the empirical analysis we investigate to what extent an individual’s timing of 
childbearing is affected by his/her choice of upper secondary schooling track. Since the 
choice of track is likely to be endogenous we instrument for the length of the track 
using the share of the available vocational tracks in the municipality which constituted 
the new 3-year tracks. The results show that women who enrolled in the 3-year tracks 
were significantly less likely to give birth by age 20 and that this effect is driven by 
women with highly educated parents and women with high ability. These findings are 
consistent with the idea that individuals with higher opportunity costs of child rearing 
postpone the decision to have kids. There is however no significant effect on men’s fer-
tility.  
                                                 
3 Breierova and Duflo (2002) examine the consequences of a school construction program in Indonesia in 
the 1970s. The results show that female education is a stronger determinant of early childbearing than 
male education. Osili and Long (2008) represents another study for a developing country which tries to 
account for endogenous schooling decisions. 6  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
With these baseline results in mind we next set out to look at some of the channels 
through which education may affect early childbearing. After conditioning on upper 
secondary school graduation, we conclude that the absence of effects for some groups of 
students does not seem to be explained by an increased dropout rate. We next inves-
tigate how the reform affected the probability of having one’s first birth at different 
ages. This analysis indicate that the negative effect on the probability of having the first 
child by age 20 for some groups of women could solely be due to an incapacitation ef-
fect, i.e. that prolonged education reduces the time and opportunities to have children 
while in school (cf. Black, Devereux, Salvanes 2008). Last, we find no evidence that the 
reform affected total fertility as measured at age 32.  
The remainder of this paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 gives the institutional 
background to the educational reform as well as outlines our empirical strategy. It also 
provides details about Sweden’s family policy. Section 3 presents the data. The results 
are provided in Section 4 and Section 0 concludes.  
2 Background 
2.1 The  reform
4  
In Sweden, all individuals who have completed nine years of compulsory schooling are 
entitled to upper secondary education.
5 Schooling at the upper secondary level is volun-
tary although the enrollment rate for each cohort has in recent years been as high as 97 
percent. Upper secondary school comprises several different educational tracks to which 
individuals apply based on their compulsory school GPA. Students generally attend a 
school in their municipality of residence, but if the track they desire to follow is not of-
fered they can instead choose to attend in a nearby municipality.  
In 1991 the Parliament decided on a major reform of upper secondary education. Be-
fore the reform, upper secondary education consisted of a few academic and several 
vocational tracks. The vocational tracks were two years long and consisted mainly of 
                                                 
4 This section draws heavily on Hall (2012) to which we refer to for further details.    
5 Individuals who are older than 20 when they begin upper secondary education are not entitled to attend 
a general upper secondary school, but instead enter the adult education system. Within this system, both 
those who lack any upper secondary education and those who dropped out before graduating can finalize 
a degree. It is also possible to supplement e.g. a 2-year upper secondary degree in order to obtain a 3-year 
degree. For more information on the adult education system, see Stenberg (2009).   
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vocational training. The academic tracks typically lasted three years and prepared the 
students for higher education. In the years leading up to the reform, around 45 percent 
of the upper secondary school students were enrolled in vocational tracks. Construction, 
electrical engineering and caring services represented some of the most common tracks. 
Compared to the academic students, the group of vocational students was negatively 
selected in terms of compulsory school GPA and parents’ educational background.
6 
The general aim of the reform was to bring about a higher quality of education as 
well as to increase the flexibility of the upper secondary school system. The largest 
changes concerned the vocational tracks, which through the inclusion of several general 
theoretical subjects in the curriculum received a considerably higher academic content. 
The length of the vocational tracks was also extended from two to three years. These 
changes were motivated by the view that there was an increasing need for a broader 
education in working life as well as by the desire to enable everyone to continue to 
university studies. As a result of the reform, all students graduating from a vocational 
track attained basic eligibility
7 for university studies. Figure 1 illustrates the Swedish 
school system before and after the reform. 
 
  
                                                 
6 Own calculations based on the Upper Secondary School Application Record for 1986-1990.  
7 Note that ‘basic eligibility’ does not mean eligibility to all university studies as some programs have 
special requirements. 8  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
Figure 1: The Swedish school system before and after the reform 
 
 
The reform was preceded by a nation-wide pilot period between 1988 and 1993 in 
which new 3-year vocational tracks were tried out in several municipalities.
8 The vo-
cational tracks in the pilot had increased academic content compared to the regular 2-
year tracks. While Swedish was the only general theoretical subject included in all 2-
year tracks, the pilot tracks also contained English, Social Studies and an elective 
course. Math appears to be by far the most common choice of elective.
9 Another dif-
ference between the 2- and 3-year tracks was that the latter located a larger share of the 
vocational training in workplaces rather than in schools.
10  
The pilot scheme contained 6,000 educational slots in 1988, 10,000 in 1989, and 
11,200 in 1990. This represented approximately 11-20 percent of the total number of 
                                                 
8 This extensive pilot scheme was the outcome of a thorough evaluation of the vocational upper sec-
ondary education conducted by a government appointed committee (ÖGY). See e.g. Prop. 1987/88:102 
for a description of the pilot scheme.  
9 The National Board of Education (1990a) reports that 86 percent of the students in 1988 chose to study 
Math. 
10 Compared to the pilot tracks, the 3-year tracks that were implemented after the 1991 reform contained 
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slots in vocational tracks. A class in the pilot scheme would always replace a class in a 
corresponding 2-year track, implying that the total number of slots in vocational tracks 
was not expanded. On top of this, in 1987 there was a very limited pre-pilot scheme 
only including 500 educational slots.
11 
The National Board of Education was responsible for allocating the pilot scheme 
among the different vocational tracks, as well as for deciding the municipalities in 
which it was to be located. The allocation of slots among the different tracks was done 
primarily on the basis of proportionality; the goal was that each track would receive the 
same share of 3-year slots as they received of 2-year slots. There were however some 
deviations from this principle, e.g. tracks with a smaller number of slots were somewhat 
overrepresented. The allocation decision was further restricted by the fact that in the 
beginning of the pilot period no curricula had yet been prepared for some of the 3-year 
tracks. This meant that all vocational tracks could not be included in the pilot scheme 
the first years. Table A 1 shows which tracks were included each year as well as each 
track’s number of available and share vacant slots.
12  
The government stipulated that the pilot scheme be distributed among regions with 
different industry and population structures. There should also be variation regarding 
the extent to which different regions participated: in some regions, all or a large share of 
the vocational tracks should be converted to 3-year tracks, while in other regions only a 
few of the tracks should be prolonged. The motive behind these requirements was to get 
an idea of how the more extensive workplace training worked in different types of labor 
markets, as well as of the strain on the local labor market if it was implemented on a 
large scale. On top of these criteria, the National Board of Education tried to assess 
whether the local labor market would be able to arrange the extended workplace 
training in a relatively short time. To judge this they relied upon recommendations from 
employer and union representatives in different sectors. The initiative to participate al-
ways came from the municipalities themselves as they had to apply in order to be con-
                                                 
11 The 1987 tracks were somewhat different as they did not contain more extensive workplace training. 
The description of the implementation process below refers to the actual pilot scheme, as the implementation 
of the pre-pilot scheme has not been documented.  
12 The share of vacant slots was in general somewhat lower for the 3-year than for the 2-year vocational 
tracks. Table A 2 describes the mapping of old to new tracks.  10  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
sidered. The interest to participate was large; each year the demand for places in the 
pilot by far exceeded the number of available slots.    
Sweden had 284 municipalities during this time period. Only about 68 percent of 
them offered vocational tracks. Students residing in the other municipalities hence had 
to attend school in a nearby municipality if they wanted to obtain a vocational degree. 
When the pilot scheme was introduced in 1988, about 40 percent of the municipalities 
were granted participation. In 1990, this share had increased to about 52 percent. The 
extent to which the municipalities participated also increased each year, as more tracks 
were included in municipalities that already participated. 
All through the pilot period most participating municipalities came to offer both 2- 
and 3-year vocational tracks. Sometimes the exact same track was offered in both 
lengths within the same municipality. Even in municipalities only offering either 2- or 
3-year tracks, students could in some cases have a choice of program length if a nearby 
municipality offered tracks of a different length.  
2.1.1  Exploiting the pilot scheme as a policy experiment  
To understand our empirical strategy consider the following baseline specification  
 
Early childbearingijs = γEduijs + θ’Xi + κj + λs + εijs                     (1)  
 
where i indexes individual, j municipality of residence, and s upper secondary school 
starting year; Early childbearingijs is an indicator equal to one if individual i expe-
rienced his/her first birth by a given age and zero otherwise; Eduijs is a dummy which 
takes the value one if the individual chose to attend a 3-year vocational track, and zero 
if he/she attended a 2-year track;  i X  is a vector of individual and family characteristics 
(compulsory school GPA, sex, age at enrolment, immigrant background, each parent’s 
highest education level and whether both of the parents have immigrant background
13); 
j κ  and  s λ  represent municipality of residence and upper secondary school starting year 
fixed effects;  ijs ε  is an error term. The parameter of interest is γ  which ideally gives the 
causal effect of attending the longer and more academically oriented vocational track.  
                                                 
13 The background characteristics are displayed in Table 1.  
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Even though the model includes a rich set of covariates as well as controls for ability, 
as measured by compulsory school GPA, one could still be concerned that standard 
OLS estimates may be biased due to non-random selection into education. There are 
potentially a large number of unobserved factors included in  ijs ε which could be corre-
lated with an individual’s choice of track. For instance, individuals with high career 
aspirations or low discount rates may be more likely both to invest in education and to 
reduce fertility. It is also possible that investments in education and family are deter-
mined simultaneously. 
To account for endogenous schooling choices we exploit variation across regions 
over time in the implementation of the pilot scheme which preceded the reform. As pre-
viously mentioned, the pilot scheme gave some students the choice of attending a 3-year 
rather than a regular 2-year vocational track. The extent to which a person had this 
choice depended jointly on: (i) which year the student finished compulsory school, (ii) 
the student’s municipality of residence. We argue that this plausibly exogenous varia-
tion, conditional on upper secondary school starting year and municipality of residence, 
is a valid instrument for the length of the chosen track.
14  
More specifically, our instrument is the degree to which the individual’s municipality 
of residence participated in the pilot scheme by the time he or she began upper sec-
ondary school, as measured by the share of the available vocational tracks which consti-
tuted 3-year track
15, i.e.  ∑ >
− N
l l year Track N } 2 { 1
1 16
. Assuming that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with any unobserved variables affecting the conditional outcomes of in-
terest, and that it had no direct effect on the outcomes other than through influencing 
whether the person attended a 2- or a 3-year track, an instrumental variables (IV) esti-
mator ofγ  is consistent. In the empirical analysis we provide several pieces of evidence 
which supports the validity of these assumptions. If the effect of attending the 3-year 
track varies across individuals, the IV estimate should be interpreted as the effect for 
                                                 
14 This identification strategy has previously been used by Hall (2012) to investigate the effect of the 
reform on educational attainment and earnings. Similar strategies have also been used in other studies; see 
e.g. Duflo (2001).  
15 Ideally, the instrument would be measured as the share of slots in vocational tracks which represented 
3-year tracks. However, such data are not available at the municipality level 
16 N is the number of available vocational tracks. The instrument is zero for municipalities not offering 
any vocational tracks. 12  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
individuals who on the margin are induced to select the new tracks because of the pilot 
scheme and the margin that varies with the instrument (e.g. Björklund and Moffitt 1987; 
Heckman and Vytlacil 2005).   
It is important to note that the design of the pilot scheme generates a setting where 
some students were given the choice of attending a 3-year rather than an ordinary 2-year 
vocational track. Because individuals are allowed to drop out of school, the parameter 
we estimate is thus not necessarily the same as in studies on compulsory schooling re-
forms where individuals are forced to stay in school. However, as long as countries de-
cide to keep their higher education voluntary, we believe that this parameter is relevant 
for public policy. We discuss effects of the reform on the risk of dropping out in 
Section 4.3. It is also worth mentioning that just as for studies exploring compulsory 
schooling reforms our estimates reflect the combined effect of prolonging education as 
well as of making it more academic.  
2.2  Sweden’s family policy 
Sweden is well-known for its extensive welfare state which encompasses a number of 
measures to assist children and their parents (Björklund 2006). Child care is heavily 
subsidized and local governments are obliged to provide care to cover the time the par-
ents spend on market work and education. There is also a flat rate child allowance. The 
Swedish parental leave system is earnings related, and individuals that had low earnings 
prior to the birth of the child receive lower benefits for the entire parental-leave period. In 
the early 1990s, the replacement rate amounted to 90 percent of the previous earnings. Indi-
viduals that had not been working before the birth (i.e. students enrolled in upper secondary 
education) were entitled to the minimum replacement rate of about 8 EUR/day (in current 
prices) for a maximum of 15 months (RFV 2002).       
As in most western countries, the fertility rate has gradually declined over the past 
decades and is currently below the replacement level. In 1997, the fertility rate reached 
an average of 1.52 children per woman (Andersson 1999). This development has coin-
cided with a general shift towards postponed childbearing. The vast majority of Swedish 
women are cohabiting at the time of their first birth and marriage rates have been de-
clining for several decades. Between the years 1993 and 2003 the average age at first 
marriage increased from 28.3 to 31.3 (Statistics Sweden 2006).  
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Abortions have been allowed basically on demand and free of charge since 1975 and 
the abortion rate is fairly high in comparison with other western countries (Santow and 
Bracher 1999). The birth control pill was introduced in 1964 and has since 1989 been 
heavily subsidized. The pill is the most common contraceptive method among young 
women and about 60 percent of Swedish women age 18–24 regularly use oral 
contraceptives. Sex education has been part of the national
 curriculum in compulsory 
school since 1956 and includes
  information on contraception as well as sexually 
transmitted diseases (Edgardh 2002).  
3  Data and sample selections 
The analysis exploits rich micro data covering the entire Swedish working-age popula-
tion during the period 1985–2007.
17 The database includes a large set of standard indi-
vidual characteristics (age, marital status, incomes, place of residence etc.) as well as 
detailed information of an individual’s entire educational history, ranging from compul-
sory school through university. It also contains a link between children and their 
biological parents. This is advantageous since it minimizes the problem of poor child-
parent match rates inherited in many previous studies. Another benefit of using register 
data is that it decreases measurement error in education.  
We used the Upper Secondary School Application Record to obtain information on 
when and where an individual began upper secondary school as well as what track (type 
and length) he/she started. The register is used to construct the sample of individuals 
and to acquire information on which educational tracks each municipality offered each 
year. Based on this information we then determined which municipalities participated in 
the pilot scheme each year and the share of the available vocational tracks which consti-
tuted 3-year tracks.
18  
Our main sample consists of all individuals who completed compulsory school du-
ring 1986–1990 and thereafter continued directly to upper secondary school. Only indi-
viduals who began a vocational track are included in the sample.
19 Another restriction is 
                                                 
17 The data originates from Statistics Sweden but was obtained via IFAU.  
18 The tracks in the 1987 ‘pre-pilot scheme’ are also categorized as part of the pilot scheme. 
19 In Section 4.3 we show evidence indicating that the pilot scheme did not affect selection into vocational 
tracks.   14  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
that only pilot tracks which corresponded to tracks in the regular system are included, 
and vice versa. Our sample consists of 185,189 individuals.   
The empirical analysis centers on a few different fertility outcomes. We are primarily 
interested in the probability of giving birth by age 20. But we also study the number of 
children at age 32 (the oldest age all individuals in the sample have reached the last year 
for which we have data) and the probability of being childless at this age.   
We augmented the dataset with information on each parent’s education measured in 
the year the students began upper secondary school and on their foreign background. 
Region of residence is defined as the municipality of residence during the fall semester 
of the subject’s last year of compulsory school. This way we avoid the possibility that 
municipality of upper secondary school attendance may be endogenous with respect to 
the location of pilot scheme.
20  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for selected variables broken down by gender.
21 
We can see that teenage childbearing is more frequent among women than among men. 
The share of women who experienced their first birth by age 20 is 9.1 percent while the 
corresponding number for men is 2.1 percent. However, conditional on having the first 
child no later than age 20 women and men are about the same age when their first child 
is born. It is also evident that women have their first child together with men that are 
substantially older. Conditional on giving birth to the first child by age 20 women are 
on average four years younger than their partner, while men have partners of similar 
age.  
Figure 2 analyses the age difference between partners in more detail by showing the 
age difference between the individuals in our sample and the parent of their first child, 
conditional on having the first child by age 20. The top figure shows the distribution of 
the age gap for the women in our sample and the bottom figure displays the same gap 
for the men. A positive difference indicates that the father of the child is older than the 
                                                 
20 It is unlikely that students would move already during compulsory school in order to take advantage of 
the pilot tracks, especially as it was already possible to apply to upper secondary schools in municipalities 
other than ones own. Moreover, the decision of where to locate the new available pilot slots each year 
was not taken until during the following spring, i.e. after the point in time when we measure municipality 
of residence (see SOU 1989:106 for details on the implementation process).    
21 Table A 3 contains a detailed description of how the variables we use in the analysis have been con-
structed and from which registers the information was collected.  
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mother. We can see that virtually no females have their first child together with a 
younger male. In contrast, there is no clear age difference between teenage fathers and 
the mother of their child. If an older partner indicates a more stable relationship, this 
discrepancy could mean that women’s early pregnancies to a greater extent are planned 
than among teenage fathers. An additional indication that the women may be in more 
stable relationships can be seen in Table 1 where it is shown that a larger share of the 
teenage mothers are married/cohabiting with the child’s other parent at age 31, com-
pared to the teenage fathers.  
As could be expected based on the previous literature, Table 1 shows that those who 
have children in their teens have less education and lower earnings later in life com-
pared to the rest of the sample. This pattern exists for both women and men. Note also 
that with the exception of compulsory school GPA the background characteristics are 
similar across gender.   
  
  16  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
Table 1: Sample characteristics by gender  
 Women  Men 
First birth by age 20   .091 (.288)  .021 (.142) 
Age at firth birth, conditional on first birth by age 20  19.28 (.890)  19.37 (.922) 
Age of partner at first birth, conditional on first birth  
by age 20 
23.30 (3.65)  19.86 (2.60) 
Married/cohabiting with the same partner at age 31, 
conditional on first birth by age 20 
.366 (.482)  .302 (.459) 
Number of children by age 32   1.44 (1.08)  .928 (.997) 
Childless at age 32   .258 (.437)  .455 (.498) 
    
At least 3 years of upper secondary educ. by age 31, 
conditional on first birth by age 20 
.318 (.466)  .196 (.397)   
At least 3 years of upper secondary educ. by age 31, 
conditional on no child by age 20 
.532 (.499)  .384 (.486) 
Annual wage earnings
 a at age 31, conditional on first 
birth by age 20  
115,300 (90,740)  193,200 (116,200) 
Annual wage earnings
 a at age 31, conditional on no 
child by age 20 
132,200 (95,150)  219,900 (117,300) 
    
Individual background characteristics:      
Foreign-born  .018 (.133)  .017 (.128) 
Age at enrolment in upper secondary school    16.02 (.162)  16.05 (.218) 
GPA compulsory school
b  3.01 (.513)  2.77 (.509) 
    
Parental characteristics:     
Both parents foreign born  .028 (.165)  .029 (.167) 
Mother has at most compulsory education
c  .477 (.499)  .459 (.498) 
Mother has 2 years of upper secondary education  .390 (.488)  .392 (.488) 
Mother has at least 3 years of upper secondary educ.  .133 (.340)  .148 (.355) 
Father has at most compulsory education
c  .531 (.499)  .519 (.500) 
Father has 2 years of upper secondary education  .271 (.445)  .275 (.447) 
Father has at least 3 years of upper secondary educ.  .198 (.398)  .206 (.405) 
Number of observations  74,220  110,969 
Notes: a) In SEK 2006. b) Compulsory school GPA is set on a scale 1 through 5. c) This category includes 
individuals where information on mother’s/father’s education is missing.  
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Figure 2: Age gap between partners by gender for individuals who had their first birth by age 20  
 
 
Note: The top figure shows the age difference between the women in our sample and the fathers of their first child, 
conditional on the woman having her first birth by age 20. The bottom figure replicates the graph for the men in our 
sample. 
4 Results   
This section presents the results from our empirical analysis. As previously mentioned, 
we relate the timing of childbearing to an individual’s choice of whether or not to attend 
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selection into schooling we instrument for the choice of track using the share of the 
available vocational tracks which constituted the new 3-year tracks in the individual’s 
municipality of residence.  
We do all analyses separately for men and women. We also present results both for 
the entire group of vocational students and for population subgroups defined by parents’ 
educational background and the subject’s ability. We define “Parents with low educa-
tion” as neither parent having more than two years of upper secondary education, and 
“Parents with high education” as at least one parent having completed more than two 
years of education. “Low GPA” is defined as having a final compulsory school GPA 
(strictly) below the average among all students throughout the country, and “High 
GPA” as having a final GPA above this average. To deal with potential serial correla-
tion and heteroscedasticity, the standard errors are estimated by clustering at the munici-
pality level (284 cells) (e.g. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). 
In subsection 4.1 we present our main results and subsection 4.2 provides falsifica-
tion and robustness checks. In subsection 4.3 we extend the analysis by investigating the 
mechanisms through which education policy may affect early childbearing. Here we 
also examine the effects on long-run fertility.     
4.1  The effect on early childbearing 
Before proceeding to the results we show estimates for the first-stage relationship, i.e. 
the relationship between the pilot scheme intensity in an individual’s municipality of 
residence and his/her choice of vocational track. Table 2 displays estimates from regres-
sions both with and without controls for background characteristics. We can see that the 
first-stage relationship is strong and that standard F-tests clearly indicate that a weak 
instrument is not a concern (cf. Staiger and Stock 1997).  Note also that the coefficient 
for the instrument is very robust to the inclusion of covariates in the model. In Table A 
4 we show separate first-stage estimates for the different subgroups. The estimates are 
similar across subgroups, indicating that any differences in effects between the groups 
cannot be explained by differential responses to the instrument.   
Table 2 also shows that the students in the 3-year tracks are positively selected in 
terms of parents’ educational background and, for women, also in terms of compulsory 
school GPA. Women with foreign-born parents are less likely to enroll in the longer  
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vocational tracks, while there is no difference depending on foreign background for 
men. 
Table 2: First stage regressions: The effect on the probability of enrolling in a 3-year track 
 Women  Men 
Entire sample    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 




.462***    
(.047) 
.660***   
(.059) 
.659***    
(.059) 
      
Birth year (dummies)  No   Yes  No  Yes 








.016    
(.013) 
  .007   
(.012) 
Both parents are foreign-born   
 
-.017*    
(.009) 
 -.002     
(.007) 
Mother’s  education  level:      
   ≤ 9 years of compulsory educ.    Ref.    Ref. 
   2 years of upper secondary educ.   
 




   ≥3 years of upper secondary educ.   
 
.027***   
(.004) 
  .012***    
(.003) 
   Missing data   
 
.002    
(.005) 
  .001    
(.005) 
Father’s  education  level:      
   ≤ 9 years of compulsory educ.    Ref.    Ref. 
   2 years of upper secondary educ.   
 
.005*   
(.003) 
 .004**     
(.002) 
   ≥3 years of upper secondary educ. 
 
  .019***   
(.003) 
  .010***   
(.003) 
   Missing data   
 
.007*    
(.004) 
 -.000     
(.004) 
F-statistic on the instrument     96.00  97.83  124.02  124.11 
Number  of  obs.  74,221 74,221 110,968  110,968 
Notes: The instrument is the share of available vocational tracks in the municipality of residence at the time of 
enrollment which constituted 3-year tracks. All regressions include municipality of residence and upper secondary 
school starting year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of re-
sidence. */**/*** denotes significance on the 10/5/1 percent level.  
Table 3 displays OLS and IV estimates of the effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational 
track on the probability of giving birth by age 20. The IV estimates are presented both 
with and without controls for background characteristics. To conserve space we do not 
report the estimates for the control variables (available on request). In general, these 
show that early pregnancies are negatively correlated with GPA and parents’ education, 
and positively correlated with immigrant status.  
Starting with women, the OLS estimate in Panel A (Col. 1) shows a small and 
statistically insignificant negative effect of enrolling in a 3-year, rather than a 2-year, 20  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
vocational track on the probability of having the first child by age 20. The IV estimates 
on the other hand indicate a negative effect. The coefficient in our preferred specifica-
tion (Col. 3) suggests that enrolling in a longer and more academically oriented track 
reduces the probability of experiencing the first birth by age 20 by about 4 percentage 
points. This effect is statistically significant. In relation to the mean of the dependent 
variable it translates into a reduction of about 44 percent (–.040/.091). This is by all 
measures is a substantial effect.  
The estimated effect is sizable also in comparison to other interventions explicitly 
designed to reduce teenage pregnancies. Our reduced form estimate, shown in Table A 
5, suggests that going from a situation with no 3-year tracks in a municipality to a 
situation where all tracks are 3-year long decreases the probability of a teenage birth by 
about 20 percent (–.018/.091). The magnitude of the effect is thereby similar to the esti-
mated effect of giving teenagers access to a major subsidy of oral contraceptives pre-
sented in Grönqvist (2009). It is more than twice as large as that of the compulsory 
schooling reforms in the US and Norway; Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) find 
that these reforms reduced the probability of a teenage birth by between 5 and 9 percent. 
One explanation for why our estimates are larger could be that education policy targeted 
at the upper secondary level involves greater non-monetary returns. Another reason 
might be that in contrast to the changes in compulsory schooling laws which took place 
in the 1960s and 1970s (at the latest) we are studying a reform that occurred quite re-
cently. It is possible that institutional features relevant for fertility have changed up until 
today (e.g. new contraceptive technologies, access to abortions, increased enrolment in 
higher education among women etc.) which may have increased the return to educa-
tional investments.
22  
Panels B and C show results by parents’ educational attainment. The IV estimates 
show no statistically significant effect for women whose parents have low education. 
There is however a significant negative effect on early fertility for women with highly 
educated parents. A similar pattern can be observed in the separate analyses of women 
with a low respectively high compulsory school GPA (Panels C and D). The IV esti-
                                                 
22 Another explanation for the relatively large effect is that the estimate captures the average effect of attending a 3-
year track for individuals who were induced to choose a longer program as a consequence of increased access to the 
new tracks. The effect on early childbearing in this group could differ from the effect in the total population.   
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mates show that women with a high GPA are significantly less likely to give birth by 
age 20 if enrolled in a 3-year track, but there is no significant effect for women with a 
low GPA.  
The results in Panels B through D are consistent with the story that the effect of the 
reform is larger for women with higher opportunity costs of child rearing. Black, Deve-
reux and Salvanes (2008) also find substantially larger effects in more affluent sub-
groups (urban residents and whites), which are likely to have higher opportunity costs 
of child rearing. Another possible explanation of the differential effects by parental 
background is that highly educated parents put more pressure on their daughters to not 
have children before finishing school. These results contrast to those presented in 
Grönqvist (2009) where the impact on early fertility of providing subsidized contracep-
tives is found to be stronger for socioeconomic disadvantaged groups. This suggests that 
different policies may induce different behavioral responses in some parts of the popula-
tion. 
As mentioned earlier, this is the first paper that investigates the effect of changes in 
education policy on men’s fertility in a developed country. Columns (4)-(6) display the 
estimates for males. Looking at Panel A it is clear that there is no statistically significant 
effect of enrolling in the 3-year tracks on the probability of having the first child by age 
20. This result holds also when analyzing different subgroups in Panels B through D. 
Both the OLS and IV estimates are statistically insignificant for all groups.   
Why does education seem to matter only for women? One possible explanation is 
that females by tradition have had a greater control over the risk of becoming pregnant; 
for instance, by regulating the use of contraceptives or deciding on whether or not to 
abort an unwanted pregnancy.
23 The opportunity cost of having children while being 
enrolled in school is also likely to be higher for females because of the interruption due 
to giving birth and since they  usually spend more time with their children than the 
fathers, at least in the months following the birth. In this context it is further interesting 
to note that our descriptive evidence indicated that women’s early pregnancies may be 
planned to a greater extent compared to teenage fathers. Table 1 showed that teenage 
                                                 
23 Although the possibility for women to control their own fertility need not necessarily be the same in other contexts, 
it is interesting to note that our findings parallel the results in Duflo and Breierova (2004) for Indonesia. 22  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
childbearing is more frequent among women and that the women who have children 
early tend to have older partners. If education policy more strongly influences planned 
births this could potentially also explain our findings. 
One last thing to note in Table 3 is that the IV estimates for all subgroups remain 
remarkably stable when adding covariates to the model (compare Col. 2 and 3, and Col. 
5 and 6). The fact that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of controls for some ar-
guable very important background characteristics, suggests that omitted characteristics 
may be unimportant as well. This finding thus strengthens our confidence that omitted 
variables are not driving our results. In the next section we continue by presenting re-
sults from additional robustness checks.    
 
 
Table 3: The effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational track on the probability of having the first child by age 20 
   Women     Men   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS IV  IV    OLS IV  IV 
A. Entire sample          














Mean of dependent variable     .091  .091  .091    .021  .021  .021 
Number of obs.  74,221  74,221  74,221    110,968  110,968  110,968 
B. Parents with low education          
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational 
track 
.000    
(.004) 




  -.002   
 (.002) 




Mean of dependent variable  .102      .102      .102        .023  .023  .023  
Number of obs.  53,927  53,927 53,927   78,656 78,656 78,656 
C. Parents with high education               
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational 
track  
-.009**    
(.004) 
-.080**   
(.039)   
-.082** 
(.039) 
 .001     
(.002) 




Mean of dependent variable  .064  .064  .064    .015  .015  .015 
Number of obs.  20,294  20,294 20,294   32,312 32,312 32,312 
   
Table 3, cont.   Women     Men   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  OLS IV  IV    OLS IV  IV 
D. Low GPA          
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational 
track 
-.008   
 (.006) 
-.015    
(.043)     
-.020 
(.041) 
  -.003    
(.002) 




Mean of dependent variable  .133  .133  .133    .026  .026  .026 
Number of obs.  33,194  33,194 33,194   69,146 69,146 69,146 
E. High GPA                
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year vocational 
track  
-.004    
(.003) 




  -.000    
(.002) 




Mean of dependent variable  .057  .057  .057    .011  .011  .011 
Number of obs.  41,027  41,027 41,027   41,822 41,822 41,822 
All control variables included  Yes  No  Yes    Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. All regressions include municipality of residence and upper secondary school starting year fixed effects. Col. (1), 
(3), (4) and (6) additionally control for: compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dummies), each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether 
both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on parents’ education. “Parents with low education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of 
upper secondary education; and “parents with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper secondary education. “Low GPA” is 
defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high GPA” as having scored at least the mean compulsory school GPA. The (potentially) 
endogenous variable takes the value one if the individual enrolled in the 3-year vocational track and zero if the individual enrolled in a regular 2-year track. The 
instrument is the share of available vocational tracks in the municipality of residence at the time of enrollment which constituted 3-year tracks. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of residence. */** denotes significance on the 10/5 percent level.   
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4.2 Robustness  checks 
4.2.1  Testing the validity of the empirical strategy 
Recall that our identification strategy hinges on several assumptions. First, the instrument 
should not be correlated with any unobserved variables affecting early fertility. The 
instrument should also have no direct effect on the outcome other than through influen-
cing whether a person enrolled in a 2- or a 3-year vocational track. In this subsection we 
present results from several tests of the validity of our strategy.  
One way of investigating if our results are spurious is to use the fact that the length 
of the academic tracks in upper secondary school was not altered during the pilot pe-
riod.  Hence, the extent to which a region participated in the pilot scheme should be 
uncorrelated with changes in the early fertility of academic students. Such a correlation 
would instead indicate the presence of some unobserved factor which is correlated with 
the pilot scheme as well as with the outcome of interest.  
To carry out this falsification test we estimated the following regression for students 
enrolled in academic tracks 
   
Early childbearingijs = α ∑ >
− N
l l year Track N } 2 { 1
1  + π’Xi + ρj + ωs + vijs              (2)   
                 
where  ∑ >
− N
l l year Track N } 2 { 1
1 is the share of the available vocational tracks, in an 
individual’s municipality of residence, which constituted 3-year tracks by the time he or 
she began upper secondary school
24; Xi represents a vector of control variables; ρj and  
ωs are municipality and school starting year fixed effects.  
Table 4 displays our results. To facilitate comparison, the top part of the table shows 
the reduced form impact for vocational students. As expected, there is a statistically 
significant negative effect of the instrument on the probability of experiencing the first 
birth by age 20 for female students in vocational tracks; however there is no significant 
effect for women who enrolled in academic tracks. The effect for men is statistically 
                                                 
24 Obviously, the reason for focusing on the reduced form impact instead of instrumenting for the choice 
of track length is that the academic tracks were unaffected by the reform. The reduced form estimates 
should be interpreted as the effect of going from a situation with no 3-year vocational tracks in the 
municipality to a situation where all tracks are 3-year tracks.  26  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
 
insignificant for both groups of students. We think that these findings provide strong 
support for the validity of our empirical strategy.    
Table 4: Falsification tests using students in academic tracks. Reduced form estimates.  










Mean of dependent variable  .091  .021 
Number of observations  74,221  110,968 






Mean of dependent variable  .017  .004 
Number of observations  119,808  104,453 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. In addition to municipality of residence and upper secondary 
school starting year FE:s, all regressions control for: compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year 
(dummies), each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and 
missing data on parents’ education. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality 
of residence. */** denotes significance on the 10/5 percent level. 
Hall (2012) provides additional tests of the validity of the instrument by checking 
whether the localization of pilot slots is correlated with changes in observed student 
characteristics (basically the background characteristics listed in Table 1). The results 
show no clear relationship between the pilot intensity and changes in student 
characteristics, which suggests that the pilot also may be uncorrelated with changes in 
unobserved factors.  
Another concern is that the availability of pilot tracks may have affected an individu-
al’s choice of whether or not to enroll in a vocational track. If this is the case, restricting 
the sample to vocational students could introduce some sample selection issues that 
could lead to bias in the results.
25 To examine this concern we regressed an indicator of 
enrolling in a vocational rather than an academic track on the intensity of the pilot 
scheme in the individual’s municipality of residence, controlling for municipality of 
residence and school starting year fixed effects as well as the other covariates. In Table 
5 we can see that there is no statistically significant effect of access to the pilot scheme 
on the likelihood of selecting a vocational track.
26 
27  
                                                 
25  Note that this is only a concern if our control variables are not rich enough to account for such 
compositional changes. 
26 Hall (2012) provides additional tests of this concern. She uses a difference-in-difference strategy in 
which she compares the share of students starting vocational or academic tracks before and after the pilot 
scheme was introduced, and contrasts this estimate across municipalities which differed in their extent of 
participation. Her results indicate that selection into vocational tracks was not affected by the pilot. Using  
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Table 5: Effect of pilot intensity on the probability of enrolling in a vocational track  











    
Mean of dependent variable  .383  .515 
Number of obs.  194,028  215,422 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. Pilot intensity is the share of available vocational tracks 
in the municipality of residence which constituted 3-year tracks (at the time of enrolment in upper sec-
ondary school). In addition to municipality of residence and upper secondary school starting year FE:s, the 
regressions control for:  compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dummies), each parent’s 
educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on parents’ 
education. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of residence. 
*/**/*** denotes significance on the 10/5/1 percent level.  
It is possible – though it seems unlikely – that the longer and more academic pilot tracks 
attracted students who would otherwise have chosen not to advance to upper secondary 
school. Hall (2012) investigates this potential concern using data on all students who 
graduated from compulsory school during 1988-1990. She finds no evidence that the 
pilot scheme affected selection into upper secondary school.   
A final concern is that the pilot scheme may not only have affected the subjects 
themselves but may also have led to a behavioral response among potential partners. If 
individuals choose partners of a similar age in the same municipality then it is likely 
that also the partners were influenced. In this case the IV assumptions may be violated. 
For this reason it is reassuring that Figure 2 revealed that women who give birth early 
tend to have children with males that are substantially older. This suggests that this 
potential problem is less severe for women. However, we also saw in Figure 2 that a 
substantial fraction of the teenage fathers have their first child with a woman of the 
same age or younger. It is therefore encouraging to note that the reduced form estimates 
parallel our main results in Table 3. The reduced form estimates (displayed in Table A 
                                                                                                                                               
the same strategy she also investigates whether the composition of vocational students changed as a result 
of the pilot, but finds no evidence suggesting compositional changes.  
27 A possible explanation for why the pilot tracks does not seem to have attracted students from academic 
tracks has to do with uncertainty about the localization of the pilot scheme at the time when students ap-
plied to upper secondary school. SOU 1989:90 and 1990:75 report that the decision of where to locate 
new pilot tracks sometimes was taken after the deadline for application to upper secondary school. Case 
studies of the implementation process describe how municipalities then let the students who had already 
applied to vocational tracks reapply in order to be considered for the new tracks. The practices however 
are likely to have differed somewhat across municipalities. 28  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
 
5) incorporate all channels through which the policy change may affect fertility and tells 
us about the overall effect of the pilot scheme on early fertility. 
4.2.2  Alternative measure of pilot scheme intensity       
Our instrument – the degree to which an individual’s municipality of residence partici-
pated in the pilot when he/she began upper secondary school – is measured as the share 
of the available vocational tracks which constituted 3-year tracks. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2.1.1 a more ideal measure would be the share of slots in vocational tracks which 
represented 3-year tracks, but this type of data is not available at a disaggregated level. 
To check whether our results could be sensitive to this type of measurement error in the 
instrument, we have repeated our analysis with an alternative measure of pilot scheme 
intensity. We instead define pilot intensity as the share of students enrolling in voca-
tional tracks, in an individual’s municipality of residence, who enrolled in 3-year tracks. 
This is not a perfect measure of the supply of pilot slots either, as it is likely to be af-
fected by student demand – it is common that not all slots are filled (see Table A 1) and 
it is conceivable that municipalities sometimes increase the number slots as a reaction to 
a large demand. Nevertheless, it is reassuring to see that our results are very similar 
when we use this alternative measure as instrument; see Table A 6.  
4.3  Extensions: potential mechanisms and total fertility 
Having established that our results are unlikely to be explained by factors that could 
invalidate our identification strategy, we continue the analysis by investigating some of 
the channels through which an extension of upper secondary education may affect early 
childbearing. We also provide some results on the impact on total fertility.  
4.3.1  Are increased dropout rates explaining the (absence of) effects for some 
subgroups? 
Recall that the pilot scheme implied a possibility of attending a prolonged and more 
academically oriented vocational track. Not all students, however, may benefit from an 
upper secondary education with a substantial academic content (Brunello and Checchi 
2007). Beginning a longer and academically more challenging track may increase the 
probability of dropping out and could thereby have a negative impact on some students’ 
educational attainment. Hall (2012) examines the effect of the reform on the probability  
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of graduating from upper secondary school and finds a negative effect for students with 
low ability and with non-academic parents. This could potentially explain why we do 
not find any significant effect of enrolling in a 3-year track on early fertility for some 
subgroups. To examine this issue we re-estimated our model conditional on actually 
graduating from upper secondary school.
28 The results (available on request) are similar 
in this analysis, which indicates that increased dropout rates are not explaining these 
results.
29 
4.3.2  Is it an incapacitation effect? 
Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) argue that individuals enrolled in education may 
strictly mechanically not have the time, desire or opportunity to have a child. To test 
whether the effects of compulsory schooling on teenage childbearing in the US and 
Norway operate through such an ‘incapacitation effect’, they investigate how compul-
sory schooling laws affect the probability of having one’s first child at different ages, 
conditional on not having a child before then. The idea is that if the delayed child-
bearing is solely caused by an incapacitation effect, then compulsory schooling laws 
should have no behavioral effect at ages beyond those directly affected by the reform. 
Their results however show negative effects on fertility also at higher ages, suggesting 
that the incapacitation effect is not the only mechanism at work.  
We use the same strategy to investigate whether the negative effect of attending a 3-
year track on the probability of having the first child by age 20, could be explained by 
incapacitation. Although the same argument not readily extends to voluntary education 
(as in the case of upper secondary education), since it does not force individuals to stay 
in school, it is likely that conditional on having enrolled individuals still face a high 
opportunity cost of dropping-out which restrains them from quitting school.  
The policy change of interest in our paper delayed graduation from upper secondary 
school from (typically) age 18 to 19. Since a pregnancy lasts for about nine month, we 
should therefore not expect any negative effects on births above age 20 if the incapacita-
tion mechanism is the only mechanism at work. As pointed out by Black, Devereux and 
                                                 
28 A person is considered to have dropped out if he or she still has not graduated six years after being admitted (based 
on data from the Upper Secondary School Graduation Record). 
29 Note however that we are limiting the sample based on an outcome variable, which may introduce some sample-
selection issues that could bias the results. 30  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
 
Salvanes (2008), this mechanism would be difficult to identify if the policy change also 
increased transitions to higher education. However, Hall (2012) found no evidence that 
the Swedish reform affected transitions to university studies.  
Table 6 presents the results from this analysis. We only focus on women here since 
our main analysis found no effect for men. There is no evidence of negative effects of 
enrolling in the 3-year tracks on births beyond age 20. This result holds also when re-
peating the exercise for different subgroups of the population. Hence, the results suggest 
that the negative effect on the probability of having the first child by age 20 may be 
solely due to an incapacitation effect. When interpreting these results we should note 
that conditioning on not already having a child creates a selected sample. However, the 
conclusions remain the same if we include all individuals in the regressions (results 
available on request).   
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Table 6: The effect on women’s probability of having a child at a given age, conditional on not 
already having a child   
  ‹=Age 18  Age 19  Age 20  Age 21  Age 22 









.012    
(.022) 
.013    
(.023) 
Sample mean  .017  .028 .049 .063 .073 
Number of observations   74,221 72,984 70,906 67,454 63,189 







.021    
(.030) 
.021    
(.029) 
Number of observations  53,927 52,929 51,243 48,449 45,106 
Sample mean  .018  .032 .055 .069 .080 







.002    
(.035)   
-.006    
(.035) 
Number of observations  20,294 20,055 19,663 19,005 18,083 
Sample mean  .012  .020 .033 .049 .055 
D. Low GPA       
IV  
 
-.015    
(.023) 
-.025     
(.030) 
.015    
(.035) 
.001    
(.045) 
.038    
(.049) 
Number of observations  33,194 32,296 30,897 28,770 26,418 
Sample mean  .027  .043 .069 .082 .087 
E. High GPA         
IV  
 
-.008     
(.011) 
-.022    
(.016) 
-.024    
(.022) 
.021    
(.024) 
.003    
(.026) 
Number of observations  41,027 40,688 40,009 38,684 36,771 
Sample mean  .008  .017 .033 .049 .062 
       
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. In addition to municipality of residence and upper secondary school 
starting year fixed effects, all regressions control for: compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year 
(dummies), each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data 
on parents’ education. “Parents with low education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of upper 
secondary education; and “parents with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper 
secondary education. “Low GPA” is defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high 
GPA” as having scored at least the mean compulsory school GPA. The (potentially) endogenous variable takes the 
value one if the individual enrolled in the extended 3-year vocational track and zero if the individual enrolled in a 
regular 2-year track. The instrument is the share of available vocational tracks in the municipality of residence at the 
time of enrollment which constituted 3-year tracks. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by 
municipality of residence. */** denotes significance on the 10/5 percent level. 
4.3.3  The effect on fertility later in life 
Our observation window is too short to observe completed fertility; the oldest age all 
individuals in our sample have reached the last year for which we have data is 32. We 
therefore provide evidence on the impact on fertility at this age, focusing on the total 
number of children and the probability of being childless.  
Table 7 presents IV and OLS estimates for the entire sample as well as for the dif-
ferent subgroups. While the OLS regressions for women suggest a positive and signifi-
cant relationship between enrollment in the longer and more academic track and the 32  IFAU – Education policy and early fertility 
 
number of children, and a significant negative relationship with the probability of being 
childless, both IV estimates are statistically insignificant (Panel A). The IV estimates 
are statistically insignificant also for men as well as for all subgroups of the population 
(Panel B−E). These results are well in line with the findings of Monstad, Propper and 
Salvanes (2008) for Norway. They find that the compulsory schooling reform, which 





                                                 
30 For the US the results are mixed: León (2004), who takes advantage of changes in state compulsory schooling 
laws, estimates a significant negative effect of educational attainment on total fertility. McCrary and Royers (2011) 
on the other hand, who exploit school entry policies, find that maternal education plays a minor role in fertility de-
cisions.  
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Table 7: OLS and IV estimates of the effect of enrolling in the 3-year track on fertility at age 32  
 Women  Men 

























Mean of dependent variable   1.437  .258  .928  .455 
Number of observations  74,221  74,221  110,968  110,968 
B. Parents with low education          
OLS 
 
.068***    
(.016) 
-.023***   
(.006) 
.015    
(.013) 












Mean of dependent variable  1.476  .246  .952  .445 
Number of observations  53,927  53,927  78,656  78,656 
C. Parents with high education          
OLS 
 




.010    
(.018)   












Mean of dependent variable  1.332  .287     .868  .480 
Number of observations  20,294  20,294  32,312  32,312 
D. Low GPA        
OLS 
 
.058**    
(.023) 
-.019**    
(.009) 
.017    
(.013) 












Mean of dependent variable  1.483  .251  .934  .455 
Number of observations  33,194  33,194  69,146  69,146 
E. High GPA        
OLS 
 
.040**    
(.017) 
-.016**    
(.007) 
.011    
(.019) 












Mean of dependent variable  1.399  .263  .917  .455 
Number of observations  41,027  41,027  41,822  41,822 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. In addition to municipality of residence and upper secondary school 
starting year fixed effects, all regressions control for: compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dummies), 
each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on parents’ 
education. “Parents with low education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of upper secondary 
education; and “parents with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper secondary 
education. “Low GPA” is defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high GPA” as having 
scored at least the mean compulsory school GPA. The (potentially) endogenous variable takes the value one if the indi-
vidual enrolled in the extended 3-year vocational track and zero if the individual enrolled in a regular 2-year track. The 
instrument is the share of available vocational tracks in the municipality of residence at the time of enrollment which 
constituted 3-year tracks. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of residence. 
*/**/*** denotes significance on the 10/5/1 percent level.  
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5 Concluding  remarks 
The social benefits of education are not yet fully understood. A large literature claims 
that teenage childbearing imposes large costs on society in terms of worse long-run so-
cial and economic outcomes for the mothers as well as their children. This paper con-
siders the role of education policy in preventing early childbearing. We study a major 
educational reform in Sweden occurring in the beginning of the 1990s in which voca-
tional tracks in upper secondary school were prolonged from two to three years and the 
curricula were made more academic. Our research design exploits cross-regional and 
cross-time variation in the implementation of a pilot scheme preceding the reform in 
which several municipalities evaluated the new policy.  Relying on rich register data we 
find that women who enrolled in the new longer tracks were significantly less likely to 
give birth early in life and that this effect is driven by women with higher opportunity 
costs of child rearing. We also find that the policy change had no effect on men’s fer-
tility decisions.  
The results in the present paper suggest that prolonging the vocational upper secon-
dary education by one year and making it more academic reduced the probability of 
teenage childbearing by 44 percent. The evidence provided therefore indicates that the 
social benefits of education policy may extend beyond those usually claimed.  
In this context it is relevant to ask whether the results in this paper may extend to 
other settings. Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2008) show that there are remarkable 
similarities in the effect of education on fertility between the US and Norway, despite 
that the two countries are so different institutionally. This suggests that the findings in 
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Table A 1: Number of available places and share of vacant places by pilot track and year 
  1987  1988 1989 1990 
















Electrical engineering   48  0.00  528    0.02  656    0.03  776    0.02 
Health care  46  0.02  2 182    0.03  2 918    0.03  3 072    0.10 
Heating, ventilation & sanitation  64  0.11  64    0.00  72    0.00  104    0.00 
Industry  352  0.01  1 608    0.09  1 952    0.13  1 968    0.12 
Business & services      210    0.01  660    0.03  990    0.05 
Caring services: children, youth      256    0.01  420    0.01  420    0.08 
Construction      296    0.08  408    0.02  432    0.01 
Textile & clothing manufacturing      136    0.11  208    0.22  224    0.17 
Transport & vehicle engineering      752    0.04  992    0.03  1 056    0.02 
Use of natural resources      352    0.12  640    0.09  720    0.04 
Constructional metalwork          56    0.14  56    0.05 
Food manufacturing          224    0.08  256    0.11 
Handicraft          32    0.03  64    0.05 
Painting          56    0.04  88    0.05 
Process technology          176    0.17  208    0.23 
Restaurant           336    0.00  416    0.00 
Wood technology          144    0.10  168    0.09 
Graphic           112      0.00 
Total  510  0.03  6 384    0.05  9 950    0.06  11 130    0.07 
Notes: Share of vacant places by September 15
th each year. Source: National Board of Education (1988), (1989a), 
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 Table A 2: Vocational tracks in upper secondary school 




Use of natural resources 
Business & administration 
Distribution & administration 




Caring services: children & youth  Caring services: children & youth 
Clothing manufacturing  Textile & clothing manufacturing 
Construction Construction 
Constructional metalwork 




Electrical engineering  Electrical engineering 
Food manufacturing  Food manufacturing 
Restaurant 
Operation and maintenance engineering
♦  
Process technology  Process technology 
Vehicle engineering  Transport & vehicle engineering 
Wood technology  Wood technology 






♦Tracks which do not directly correspond to any of the pilot tracks, but are still included in the analysis as 
important elements of them appear to be present on one or more of the pilot tracks. 
♣Tracks which are not included as 
they do not correspond to any of the 2-year tracks.  
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Table A 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
   
Instrument:  
Pilot scheme intensity in munici-
pality of residence 
Share of available vocational tracks which constituted 3-year tracks in 
the person’s municipality or residence, when he/she began upper secon-
dary school. (The Upper Secondary School Application Record) 
 
Outcome variables:    
Age at first birth  Dummy variable = 1 for age at first birth being ≤ j (The Multi-Genera-
tion Register) 
 
Number of children   Number of children at age 32 (The Multi-Generation Register) 
 
Childless  Dummy variable = 1 if no children at age 32; 0 otherwise (The Multi-
Generation Register) 
 
Individual characteristics:  
Female  Dummy variable = 1 if female; 0 otherwise. (The Multi-Generation Re-
gister) 
  
Immigrant background  Dummy variable = 1 if born in non-Nordic country; 0 otherwise. (LOU-
ISE) 
  
GPA compulsory school  GPA the last year of compulsory school. (Cohort 1986-87: the Upper Se-
condary School Application Record. Cohort 1988-90: the Compulsory 
School Graduation Record) 
  
Parental characteristics:  
Immigrants  Dummy variable = 1 if both biological parents are born in non-Nordic 
countries; 0 otherwise. (LOUISE) 
  
Upper secondary education  Dummy variable = 1 if the parents’ highest education is upper secondary 
education; 0 otherwise. Measured the year the student finished compul-
sory school. (LOUISE) 
  
Post-secondary education  Dummy variable = 1 if the parents’ highest education is post-secondary 
education; 0 otherwise. Measured the year the person finished compulsory 
school. (LOUISE) 
  
Notes: Statistics Sweden registers in parenthesis. Municipality of residence is measured on December 31
st the 
person’s last year of compulsory school.  
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Table A 4: First stage regressions: The effect on the probability of enrolling in a 3-year track 
         Women          Men 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Parents with low education      




.456***    
(.047) 
.657***    
(.061) 
.657***   
(.061) 
      
F-statistic on the instrument  92.88  94.53  116.42  116.42 
Number  of  obs.  53,927 53,927 78,656 78,656 
B. Parents with high education      




.485***   
(.055) 
.676***     
(.060) 
.676***   
(.060) 
      
F-statistic on the instrument  76.33  78.65  127.78  128.54 
Number  of  obs.  20,294 20,294 32,312 32,312 
C. Low GPA      
Pilot intensity in municipality of 
residence (instrument) 
.447***   
(.052) 
.447***   
(.052) 
.689***   
(.062) 
.688***   
(.062) 
      
F-statistic on the instrument  72.67  72.91  123.48  123.48 
Number  of  obs.  33,194 33,194 69,148 69,148 
D. High GPA       
Pilot intensity in municipality of 
residence (instrument) 
.471***   
(.052) 
.470***    
(.052) 
.620***   
(.065) 
.620***     
(.065) 
      
F-statistic on the instrument  81.48  81.91  89.95  90.06 
Number  of  obs.  41,027 41,027 41,822 41,822 
All control variables included  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. The instrument is the share of available vocational tracks in the 
municipality of residence at the time of enrollment which constituted 3-year tracks. All regressions include 
municipality of residence and upper secondary school starting year fixed effects. Col. (2) and (4) additionally 
control for compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dummies), each parent’s educational attainment 
(3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on parents’ education. “Parents with low 
education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of upper secondary education; and “parents 
with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper secondary education. “Low GPA” 
is defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high GPA” as having scored at least 
the mean compulsory school GPA. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of 
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Table A 5: Reduced form estimates of the effect of the reform on the probability of having the 
first child by age 20 
 Women  Men 
A. Entire sample    
Estimate -.018* 
(.010) 
-.003     
(.004) 
Mean of dependent variable     .091  .021 
Number of observations  74,221  110,968 
B. Parents with low education    
Estimate  -.012    
.012 
-.006    
(.006) 
Mean of dependent variable  53,927  78,656 
Number of observations  .102  .023 
C. Parents with high education    
Estimate  -.040**    
(.019) 
.005    
(.007) 
Mean of dependent variable  .064  .015 
Number of observations  20,294  32,312 
D. Low GPA    
Estimate  -.009     
(.019) 
-.009   
 (.007) 
Mean of dependent variable  .133  .026 
Number of observations  33,194  69,146 
E. High GPA      
Estimate  -.025**    
(.012) 
.005    
(.005) 
Mean of dependent variable  .057  .011 
Number of observations  41,027  41,822 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. In addition to municipality of residence and upper secondary school 
starting year fixed effects, all regressions control for: compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dum-
mies), each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on 
parents’ education. “Parents with low education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of upper 
secondary education; and “parents with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper 
secondary education. “Low GPA” is defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high 
GPA” as having scored at least the mean compulsory school GPA. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for 
clustering by municipality of residence. */** denotes significance on the 10/5 percent level.  
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Table A 6: The effect of enrolling in the 3-year track on the probability of having the first child by 
age 20. Regressions using an alternative definition of the instrument 
  Women Men 














A. Entire sample      
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year 
vocational track  
-.040* 
(.022)  




-.008    
(.006) 
      
Mean of dependent variable     .091  .091  .021  .021 
Number of obs.  74,221  74,221  110,968  110,968 
B. Parents with low education      








-.013   
(.008) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  .102      .102      .023   .023  
Number of obs.  53,927  53,927  78,656  78,656 
C. Parents with high education         
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year 
vocational track  
-.082** 
(.039) 






      
Mean of dependent variable  .064  .064  .015  .015 
Number of obs.  20,294  20,294  32,312  32,312 
D. Low GPA      








-.015      
(.009) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  .133  .133  .026  .026 
Number of obs.  33,194  33,194  69,146  69,146 
E. High GPA          
Effect of enrolling in the 3-year 
vocational track  
-.053* 
(.028) 




.003    
(.007) 
      
Mean of dependent variable  .057  .057  .011  .011 
Number of obs.  41,027  41,027  41,822  41,822 
Notes: Each cell represents a separate regression. All regressions include municipality of residence and upper secondary 
school starting year fixed effects as well as controls for compulsory school GPA, immigrant status, birth year (dummies), 
each parent’s educational attainment (3-levels), whether both parents are foreign-born, and missing data on parents’ 
education. “Parents with low education” is defined as neither parent having more than two years of upper secondary 
education; and “parents with high education” as at least one parent having more than two years of upper secondary educa-
tion. “Low GPA” is defined as having scored below the mean compulsory school GPA; and “high GPA” as having scored 
at least the mean compulsory school GPA. The (potentially) endogenous variable takes the value one if the individual 
enrolled in the 3-year vocational track and zero if the individual enrolled in a regular 2-year track. The original instrument 
is the share of available vocational tracks in the municipality of residence which constituted 3-year tracks. The alternative 
instrument is the share of students enrolling in vocational tracks in the municipality of residence who enrolled in 3-year 
tracks. Robust standard errors in parentheses allow for clustering by municipality of residence. */** denotes significance 
on the 10/5 percent level. 
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